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INTRODUCTION
It is a strange conflict that we have found ourselves engaged in
since September 11th. We are not sure whether we are at war, as that
term is generally understood, or if we are involved in a giant law en-
forcement roundup that is just an expanded version of our previously
labeled "war" on organized crime and "war" on drugs. It is sometimes
unclear whether suspected terrorists whose existence we happen to
discover in the United States, Afghanistan, or elsewhere should be
targeted for destruction in a military operation or captured, con-
victed, and sentenced to a term of years; whether they should be inter-
rogated for military intelligence, or Mirandized, advised of their right
to remain silent and questioned to obtain evidence that may be admis-
sible in court against them; whether they should be tried before a mili-
tary commission or a civilian jury; whether they are, in the end,
prisoners of war (POWs), detainees, or defendants. There is even
some question, from a purely legal standpoint, whether we should be
seeking out all "terrorists of global reach"' or only those who have
violated U.S. criminal laws by planning attacks against the United
States and its interests overseas.
Of course, we have long been uncertain about whether terrorism
is, in essence, a law-enforcement or a military problem. As President
Reagan stated when he signed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Terrorism Act of 1986, "We can never legislate an end to terror-
ism. . . . However, we must remain resolute in our commitment to
confront this criminal behavior in every way-diplomatically, econom-
ically, legally and, when necessary, militarily."'2 One noted commenta-
tor at the time suggested that government officials should work to
encourage the development of an international, non-military system
to combat terrorism with effective institutions for impartially adjudi-
cating claims and punishing unjust or unlawful conduct. Until that
system was in place, nation-states could use the military to act as
'judges and avengers."
'3
1 In his September 20, 2001 speech to a joint session of Congress, President
George W. Bush pledged that the American effort would not stop "until every terrorist
of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." See R.W. Apple, A Clear Mes-
sage: 'I Will Not Relent', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at Al.
2 Lou CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 654 (1991) (quoting
President Reagan's remarks on signing an anti-terrorism bill on August 27, 1986).
3 Alberto Coll, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Militay Responses to Terrorism, 81
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 297, 300 (1987), quoted inJami MelissaJackson, Comment,
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But the conflict in these two approaches to combating terrorism
has become dramatically evident since September 11th. Originally,
President Bush was prone to label al Qaeda members as criminal
"thugs" like the "Mafia."' 4 But he soon told his senior advisors, "We're
at war. There's been an act of war declared upon America by ter-
rorists, and we will respond accordingly."' 5 He followed by stating that
he wanted Osama bin Laden "dead or alive,' 6 and directing the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) to set up procedures to try captured ter-
rorists before military commissions. 7 As Time stated, "Legally, at least,
the terrorists have their wish. They are soldiers after all."
8
This dichotomy was also reflected by our subsequent actions. In
Afghanistan, "FBI [i.e., law enforcement] agents accompany .
soldiers on nearly every mission to interrogate detainees."9 Prisoners
"are interrogated by FBI agents and military intelligence officials
[both] seeking clues to al-Qaeda terror plots and the whereabouts of
Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants.. . ."0 Some are singled out
for transport to the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the
Geneva Convention on prisoners of war may or may not apply and
where a few may eventually be tried before a military commission."I
Meanwhile, Zacarias Moussaoui and John Walker Lindh, who have
been indicted by the government as al Qaeda terrorists, 12 are to be
tried in civilian courts before civilian judges and juries.
The Legality of Assassination of Independent Terrorist Leaders: An Examination of National
and International Implications, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 669, 695 (1999).
4 SeeJosh Tyrangiel, And Justice For .. , TIME, Nov. 26, 2001, at 66, 66 (quoting
President Bush's statement from his September 20, 2001 speech before Congress that
"A1-Qaeda is to terror.., what the Mafia is to crime").
5 Elaine Sciolino, Long Battle Seen: "We're at War," He Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2001, at Al (quoting an address given by President Bush to national security officials
shortly after the September l1th attacks).
6 David E. Sanger, Bin Laden Is Wanted in Attacks, "Dead or Alive, "President Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at Al (quoting President Bush in a speech delivered to
Pentagon officials on September 17, 2001).
7 See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, at 57,834-35 (Nov.
16, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
8 Tyrangiel, supra note 4, at 66.
9 Mark Mazzetti, On the Ground, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 4, 2002, at 13, 16.
10 Romesh Ratnesar, What's Become of Al-Qaeda?, TIME, Jan. 21, 2002, at 39, 39.
11 Id. at 42.
12 See Dan Eggen & Brooke A. Masters, U.S. Indicts Suspect in Sept. 11 Attacks,
WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al (describing the Moussaoui indictment); Brooke A.
Masters & Dan Eggen, Lindh Indicted on Conspiracy, Gun Charges, WASH. PosT, Feb. 6,
2002, at Al (describing the Lindh indictment).
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All of this presents numerous legal issues which will have to be
addressed by government, military, and civilian lawyers as well as the
courts in the years to come. The rules governing the approaches of
the military to war and of law enforcement officials to crime are of
course greatly different. Exactly where can and should we legally ex-
ercise power? What should be our intent when we identify the loca-
tion of suspected terrorists? What procedures must we follow to
gather intelligence or obtain evidence? What rules should apply to
their interrogation when they are captured? How should their indi-
vidual cases be adjudicated, and, if suspects are found responsible,
should they be simply detained and removed from action or punished
for their conduct?
All major national operations, such as our effort against terror-
ism, necessarily have military, intelligence, and law enforcement com-
ponents. But to avoid confusion or action at cross purposes, it is
important to analyze potential issues and to determine what approach
should predominate when there is inherent philosophical disagree-
ment between the relevant organizations. The eventual adoption of a
unified, coherent plan would be of great assistance to government of-
ficials as they seek to deal successfully with the problems raised by the
rapid growth of world-wide terrorism.
I. PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11TH: DEFINING AIl. ATTACKS AS
CRIMINAL ACTS OF TERRORISM
The United States has suffered a variety of attacks against our fa-
cilities and personnel in the last ten years from apparently stateless
assailants opposed to both our policies and presence in the Middle
East. Our response has been to identify each attack as a criminal act
of terrorism whose perpetrators should be punished as civilians under
U.S. criminal law. Thus, we initiated civilian criminal prosecution
against those who bombed the World Trade Center and planned to
destroy New York bridges and tunnels in 1993; 13 against Ramsey
Yousef for attempting to blow up airliners in the Pacific in 1994;1
4
against those who blew up the U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia
in 1996;15 and against those who seriously damaged our embassies in
13 See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d. 88, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1998); United States
v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
14 See United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
15 See Dan Eggen, U.S. Trials Unlikely for Khobar Suspects, WASH. Posr, June 23,
2001, at A22 (noting that few suspects in the bombing would likely face trial in the
United States despite a 43-count indictment).
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Africa in 1998.16 At the time of the second World Trade Center at-
tack, we were in the midst of a criminal investigation to find those
responsible for bombing the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000.17
Civilian criminal prosecution could be initiated in each of these
cases because under U.S. law all such attacks on U.S. interests are con-
sidered acts of terrorism and not acts of war, even if the target is
purely military. Section 2331 (1) of 18 U.S. Code defines terrorism as
violent acts that "appear to be intended to... coerce a civilian popula-
tion [or] influence the policy of a government by intimidation or co-
ercion."18 Although "acts of war" are referenced in the anti-terrorism
statutes, the phrase is only utilized to prohibit civil suits in connection
with such acts. 19 They are not singled out for exclusion from punish-
ment under the criminal code.
It is in the context of this definition of terrorism that President
Clinton could publicly denounce the perpetrators of the Khobar Tow-
ers and U.S.S. Cole attacks as nothing but "cowardly terrorists. ' '21 It
could be argued, of course, that the bombers in these cases were
neither cowards nor terrorists, but misguided enemy soldiers fighting
our armed forces establishment in the Middle East. Attacks initiated
by al Qaeda against these targets, and possibly even against U.S. forces
in Somalia, have been labeled as part of what has been increasingly
called "asymmetrical" or "Class C" warfare 2 1-that is, isolated, violent
raids against a nation-state's interests by identifiable, but often state-
less, organizations-as opposed to Class B (Persian Gulf War) or Class
A (World War II) warfare.2 2 As stated by Judge Reinhardt in Quinn v.
Robinson:
Neither wars nor revolutions are conducted in as clear-cut or man-
nerly a fashion as they once were .... In contrast to the organized,
clearly identifiable, armed forces of past revolutions, today's strug-
16 See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
17 SeeJohn F. Burns & Stephen Lee Myers, Destroyer Damaged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2000, at Al.
18 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (B) (i)-(ii) (2000).
19 Although federal law allows victims of terrorism to sue for their injuries, see id.
§ 2333, no action may be maintained under § 2333 for injury stemming from "acts of
war," id. § 2336(a). "Acts of war" are defined as occurring only in a declared war, id.
§ 2331 (4) (A), an armed conflict between two or more nations, id. § 2331 (4) (B), or
"military forces of any origin." Id. § 2331(4) (C).
20 See Burns & Myers, supra note 17; see also President William Clinton, Remarks
About the Saudi Arabia Explosion (June 25, 1996), at http://www.cnn.com/
WORLD/9606/25/clinton.remarks/index.html (full-text of speech).
21 Philip Bobbitt, The Indian Summer, U.T. LAW, Spring 2002, at 14, 14-15.
22 Id. at 15.
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gles are often carried out by networks of individuals joined only by a
common interest in opposing those in power. [We are naturally
offended by the tactics] used by many of those whose view of the
nature, importance, or relevance of individual human life differ
radically from ours [but they are acting in different] circumstances
that we have not experienced .... 23
Whether members of al Qaeda should be considered warriors or
terrorists is of course a reflection of the age-old problem of defining
terrorism. By one calculation, "over 100 definitions have been pro-
posed '2 4 for the term. Daniel Pickard states that the common mean-
ing which consistently reflects the essence of the various definitions is
"violence ... used for a political/religious objective, in order to affect
an intended audience, and thereby to alter an issue of public pol-
icy."2 5 This fits squarely within the U.S. criminal law definition noted
above. But Donna Arzt, Director of the Center for Global Law and
Practice at Syracuse University, states that the first of the "four or five
fundamental elements" of terrorism is that its victims are identified as
civilian "non-combatants, in order to differentiate terrorism from at-
tacks on military targets, which are outright acts of war."26
It is not necessary for purposes of this Article to finally resolve the
debate as to the proper definition of terrorism. As with other pejora-
tive words and phrases such as "racism," "fascism," and "aggressive
war," the definition depends on the circumstances and perspective of
the one defining the term. What is important is to note that in decid-
ing whether we are truly at war or are pursuing a law enforcement
operation, part of the problem we are facing today stems from the fact
that, with rare exception, 27 before September 11, 2001, we had devel-
oped the habit of classifying all attacks, regardless of target, as crimi-
nal acts of terrorism to be dealt with by civilian courts under U.S.
criminal law. The use of what amounts to weapons of mass destruc-
tion against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and action
against our military in Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen should per-
haps more properly be recognized as a series of attacks in what
amounts to a significant and long-term war against the United States.
23 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 804 (9th Cir. 1986).
24 Donna Arzt, Introduction to Terrorism and Terrorists, inJURIST: THE LEGAL. EDUC.
NEI-WORK, at http://jirist.law.pitt.edu/terrorism/terrorisml.htm (last visited Oct. 9,
2002).
25 Daniel B. Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence
Agency and International Law, 30 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (2001).
26 Arzt, supra note 24.
27 For example, President Reagan ordered air strikes against Libya following a
Berlin nightclub attack. See CANNON, supra note 2, at 653-56.
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Viewed in this manner, a more military-oriented response to the ques-
tions posed at the beginning of this Article would be justified.
II. KILL OR CAPTURE
Before moving on to more complex legal issues, some time must
be spent addressing one of the most basic questions our combined
military and FBI teams will face as they seek out terrorists around the
world. That is, once they are found, whether in caves, apartments, or
rural farmhouses in the United States and elsewhere, do we attempt to
kill them outright or attempt to capture them and bring them to trial?
As noted above, 28 prior to September 11th we were for the most
part dedicated to utilizing the civilian criminal justice system to adju-
dicate terrorist cases. We could have continued on this law enforce-
ment track afterwards and simply pursued the leadership of al Qaeda
with the aim of eventually trying all of them. Indeed, a more timid
administration might have done so on the grounds that it did not
want to insert the U.S. militarily into internal civil wars and conflicts in
countries such as Afghanistan, the Philippines, Pakistan, and India.
This administration, however, has already demonstrated that it is not
hesitant to utilize the military even if they often work in tandem with
the FBI.29
The goal of the military is essentially to destroy the enemy, not to
capture him. According to a summary of a speech falsely attributed to
Retired Air Force General Richard Hawley, the intent of the war on
terrorism should be "professional, well-executed violence [so that] af-
terwards, the other guys are all dead. That's right. Dead. Not 'on
trial,' not 'reeducated,' not nurtured back into the bosom of love." 3°1
Major General Frank Hagenbeck, commander of Operation Ana-
conda in Afghanistan, seems to agree with this philosophy, telling the
28 See supra Part I.
29 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
30 These remarks were attributed to Retired General Richard Hawley and were
widely distributed on the Internet. See, e.g., Marine [sic] Gen. l-tawley's Speech, at
http://www.infostew.com/ChangeAmerica/_changel/00000018.htm (May 7, 2002).
In fact, the remarks were made by humorist Larry Miller in a column for the Daily
Standard. See Larry Miller, You Say You Want a Resolution, DAILY STANDARD, Jan. 14,
2002, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/000/
762dbnlm.asp. General Hawley recently stated that he did not give the speech but
that he shares the sentiments expressed in it. See Barbara Mikkelson & David P. Mik-
kelson, Dick Hawley, Urban Legends Reference Pages, at http://www.snopes.com/
rumors/Hawley.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2002). 1 decided to retain the statement
because it clearly expresses the military philosophy as reflected by Major General
Frank Hagenbeck's statement. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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media, "[A]s long as they want to send them here, we will kill them
here. If they want to go somewhere else, we will kill them there."'
Law enforcement, on the other hand, is virtually always committed to
finding, arresting, and trying criminal suspects. It makes no differ-
ence whether there are only a few individuals to be targeted or a large
organization, as was the case with the Mafia, the Black Panthers, and
the Ku Klux Klan. It is irrelevant whether they have committed one
act or a series of acts in what is an assault upon the community. Odi-
ous gang leaders, like Al Capone and John Gotti, who damage our
entire society may be singled out for increased sentences, even the
death penalty after due process of law, but never for instant
termination.
So what happens if we determine that an al Qaeda cell has taken
refuge in an apartment or farmhouse in England, France, or the
United States? One can imagine the chaos that would follow once the
media finds out that the cell has been located and surrounded. De-
fense attorneys would probably appear on television demanding to
speak to their "clients" or to negotiate with the authorities; apologists
would likely expound on the motives of the beleaguered fugitives; crit-
ics would certainly censure the government for not providing enough
food and water or for not protecting civil liberties. The reaction
would probably be similar to the media circus in Waco which oc-
curred after federal agents armed with handguns and executing a law-
ful search warrant were greeted by at least seventy Branch Davidians
firing automatic assault weapons.3 2
But, if we were truly at war, then our leaders would know exactly
what to do in this situation regardless of the media attention. The
enemy would be given an opportunity to surrender, and if they did
not immediately do so, they would be obliterated by laser-guided
bombs, tank shells, or an infantry assault. Yet one must question
whether, in today's atmosphere, the United States and our allies
would place the military or national law enforcement authority in
charge once the terrorists were located. In fact, in the United States,
it is likely that our great fear of internal military action, often reflected
by vocal but erroneous assertions that posse comitatus laws33 prevent
31 Michael Elliot, Inside the Battle of Shah-i-Kot, TIME, Mar. 18, 2002, at 36, 38-39.
32 See United States v. Branch , 91 F.3d 699, 710 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing the
raid on a Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas).
33 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) ("Whoever, except in cases and tinder circum-
stances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned ....").
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military assistance to domestic law enforcement,3 4 would result in the
FBI being tasked with complete oversight of the operation. Once that
agency assumed the dominant role, what followed would not be war,
but law enforcement aimed at capturing, not destroying, the encircled
terrorists.
Another aspect of the kill or capture issue is to ask what should
happen if a terrorist leader is traced to a specific location in the
United States, Western Europe, or elsewhere. Contemplating this pos-
sibility, former General Counsel of the National Security Agency
(NSA), Stewart Baker stated:
We have judicialized more aspects of human behavior than any civi-
lization in history, and we have come to the limit of that. Frankly, if
Osama Bin Laden did this, I'm not really interested in bringing him
back for trial, and I don't think we're obligated to think in those
terms. 3
5
A number of commentators have argued that the Army would be le-
gally authorized to deploy a special team to assassinate terrorist lead-
ers. These commentators emphasize that, despite three attempts,
Congress has never passed a statute outlawing assassination. 36 The
only possible legal restriction is Executive Order 12,333 outlining the
organization of the intelligence community. This order states that
"[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States
Government shall engage in ... assassination." 3 7 The commentators
argue, however, that the order applies only to the intelligence agen-
cies, not to the Army and that, in any case, the order could be easily
34 See id.; see also Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387-90 (8th Cir. 1985) (re-
viewing the history and tradition of the Posse Comitatus Act and concluding that "mil-
itary involvement . . . does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually
regulates, forbids, or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief");
United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[The] legal standard
for determining [a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1385 is whether] 'military personnel sub-
jected the citizens to... military power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compul-
sory in nature .... '" (quoting United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194
(D.N.D. 1975))).
35 John Lancaster & Susan Schmidt, U.S. Rethinks Strategy for Coping with Terrorists,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 14, 2001, at A9.
36 See, e.g., Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 45 MERCER
L. REv. 615, 634 (1992) (noting that "[d]espite three different legislative proposals
placed before Congress between 1976 and 1980, no statute materialized" (citing Bert
Brandenburg, Note, The Legality of Assassination as an Aspect of Foreign Policy, 27 VA. J.
INT'L L. 655, 685 n.195 (1987))).
37 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, at 59,952 (Dec. 8, 1981).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
overridden by a later executive order."8 Furthermore, the word "assas-
sinate" does not really include the act of proceeding in uniform to kill
an enemy at or near the field of battle, which in this case is the entire
world.39 Finally, no matter what you call the termination of someone
like Osama bin Laden, such action would be justified under the self-
defense provisions of the United Nations Charter.
4
11
As noted above, however, law enforcement in today's culture
could never consider the pre-planned purposeful killing of a suspect
without providing a fair trial followed by the right to appeal. This
holds true regardless of the crimes believed to have been committed
by the defendant. Agents would be duty-bound to attempt to capture
the leaders and bring them into the criminal justice system.
The above situations illustrate why it is helpful to decide early on
whether or not we are truly at war. Once a choice has been made,
deciding what to do when such events occur flows naturally from the
premise that has been adopted and communicated to our citizens and
government. An early decision can help avoid placing law enforce-
ment personnel in military-style operations and tasking battle troops
to act as police officers. Based on our approach to date, it must be
anticipated that if the above scenario takes place, there would be un-
certainty at the FBI and the Pentagon as to exactly who would assume
the lead role and what the mission would be.
38 See Zengel, supra note 36, at 635 (noting that Executive Order 12,333 was in-
tended to pertain to the peacetime activities of intelligence officers and that the order
merely forestalled the possibility of more restrictive legislation); Jackson, supra note 3,
at 675 ("Although the [Executive Order] provided a response to the outrage of al-
leged assassination plots, it preserved flexibility in interpretation.").
39 See Zengel, supra note 36, at 622-25 (discussing the definition of assassination
under customary international law as "selected killing of an individual enemy by
treacherous means," for example, through non-uniformed attacks (emphasis added));
see also Pickard, supra note 25, at 14-15 (noting that, despite a traditional understand-
ing that assassination was a prohibited tactic, early scholars posited an exception to
this principle for non-sovereign enemies such as pirates).
40 The United Nations Charter explicitly recognizes a right of national self-de-
fense. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense .... "); see also Pickard, supra
note 25, at 11-12 (noting that force is authorized by the U.N. Charter if used in self-
defense and with authorization by the Security Council); Zengel, supra note 36, at
638-41 (recounting that the United States justified an attack on Libya in April 1986,
in response to a Berlin terrorist bombing, under self-defense provisions of the U.N.
Charter). See generally Jackson, supra note 3, at 679-88 (surveying scholarship on the
right of national self-defense against non-state actors).
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III. INTERROGATION
Military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents interrogat-
ing a suspected terrorist need quickly to obtain intelligence to protect
the troops on the ground and the nation as a whole. The FBI agents
working with the military and CIA overseas, although naturally inter-
ested in intelligence information, do not have a foreign intelligence
role per se. 41 A significant part of their responsibility is to seek evi-
dence that can be admitted against defendants in court. Generally,
this requires that a suspect in custody be advised of his Miranda rights,
including the right to remain silent and to be represented by coun-
sel. 42 An intelligence officer would obviously find such warnings ludi-
crous and highly counterproductive.
This basic problem inherent in combining military and law en-
forcement resources in our war on terrorism is present in numerous
cases, but the problem has been dramatically illustrated by press re-
ports surrounding the captures of Taliban sympathizer John Walker
Lindh and reputed al Qaeda Chief of Operations Abu Zubaydah. Af-
ter detailing how "Pakistani military intelligence, accompanied by
American CIA and FBI personnel wearing bulletproof vests' '43 raided
an al Qaeda headquarters and arrested Zubaydah and his followers,
Time asked in a headline, "How Do We Make Him Talk?" 44 There
followed speculation that if Zubaydah refused to answer questions,
U.S. authorities might send him to "Egypt or Jordan," nations which
have "no qualms about extracting information through torture. '45
Meanwhile, Lindh's attorneys vigorously challenged the circumstances
of his interrogation by the military, CIA, and FBI. In addition to ques-
tioning the conditions of his confinement, they complained that the
United States violated the Fifth Amendment by not allowing him to
see his attorney while he was held at a U.S. military base in
Afghanistan.46
41 Executive Order 12,333 attempted to ensure that there was no overlap between
CIA and FBI by confining the FBI's intelligence role to operations in the United
States. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, at 59,949.
42 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-72 (1966) (noting that the right to
remain silent is "fundamental to our system of constitutional rule," while the "right to
have counsel present at the interrogation is [an] indispensable [right]").
43 Tim McGirk, Anatomy of a Raid, TIME, Apr. 15, 2002, at 40, 40.
44 Jodie Morse, How Do We Make Him Talk?, TIME, Apr. 15, 2002, at 44, 44.
45 I.
46 See generally Naftali Bendavid, Analysts See Trouble Spots in Legal Case Against
Lindh, Ci-n. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2002, at CIO; Brooke A. Masters, Prosecutors Deny Claims
Lindh Was Tortured, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at A13.
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A. Does the Fifth Amendment Apply to Interrogations
Outside the United States?
The questions raised by these cases could be avoided if Fifth
Amendment protections did not apply to interrogations of citizens, or
at least non-citizens, for law enforcement purposes conducted over-
seas. Whether the protections apply is a fair question after the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez47 that the
Fourth Amendment is not applicable to searches and seizures against
foreign persons outside our territorial boundaries.48 Verdugo-Urquidez
certainly gave pause to those who had assumed that "the Constitution
follows the flag" since the Court's decision in Reid v. Covert49 that citi-
zens tried by the military in Germany and England had a right to due
process under the Constitution, including the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial.50 Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized in
Verdugo-Urquidez that the Fourth Amendment did not protect those
without "substantial connections" with the United States,5' a phrase
that clearly excludes foreign terrorist suspects. In fact, such terrorists
are closely akin to the "alien enem[ies] engaged in the hostile service
of a government at war with the United States," whom Justice Jackson
held not to be eligible for Fifth and Sixth Amendment trial guaran-
tees in Johnson v. Eisentrager.52 Finally, as a practical matter, how can
the United States insure that any individual, including a U.S. citizen,
questioned near a battlefield or in a foreign country such as Afghani-
stan, has access to adequate legal representation if he invokes his Fifth
Amendment right to a lawyer?
Although these arguments may have some merit, in the author's
opinion, it is not likely that they would prevail. Verdugo-Urquidez was a
Fourth Amendment case that relied in great part on the fact that the
Amendment concerns the rights of "the people" of the United States,
that is, a "class of persons who are part of our national community."53
The Fifth Amendment is not so limited, stating that "no person" shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself.54 Johnson, although
47 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
48 Id. at 274-75 (noting that "the text of the Fourth Amendment, its history and
our cases discussing the application of the Constitution to aliens and extraterritorial-
ity [indicate that if] there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures.., they must
be imposed by the political branches.
49 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
50 Id. at 39-40.
51 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
52 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950).
53 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (citing U.S. CONsTr. amend IV).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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referencing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 55 dealt only with the
trial rights contained in those provisions, not with Fifth Amendment
protections against self incrimination. Even Verdugo-Urquidez recog-
nized this latter privilege as a "fundamental" right of all criminal de-
fendants.5 6 In addition, the Supreme Court has recently held that the
Miranda safeguards have "become embedded in routine police prac-
tice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national
culture."
5 7
Analyzing this issue in United States v. Bin Laden,58 the embassy
bombing case, U.S. DistrictJudge Sand decided that the Fifth Amend-
ment did apply to overseas interrogation of a non-resident alien.59
His opinion relied in part on the above-cited cases but also on his
belief that "any violation of the privilege against self-incrimination oc-
curs, not at the moment law enforcement officials coerce statements
through custodial interrogation but when a defendant's involuntary
statements are actually used against him at an American criminal pro-
ceeding. ' 60 The initial question, therefore, was really one of domes-
tic, not extraterritorial, application of the Fifth Amendment. Viewed
in this context, the full protections of the Amendment are always in
force. Judge Sand stated that he appreciated the practical problems
associated with providing attorneys for defendants in a foreign culture
that has few lawyers or that generally does not allow lawyers to visit
clients during questioning.61 However, Judge Sand believed many of
these obstacles could be overcome and that, "[t]o the maximum ex-
tent reasonably possible, efforts must be made to replicate what rights
would be present if the interrogation were being conducted in
America. '62 Only then, in his opinion, could coercion be avoided and
confidence placed in the general truthfulness of any statement ob-
tained by the authorities.
63
The original report on Abu Zubaydah referenced sending him to
Egypt or Jordan;64 however, this action would not necessarily permit
U.S. authorities to evade the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
55 Johnson, 339 U.S. at 784.
56 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
57 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
58 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
59 Id. at 181-85.
60 Id. at 181-82.
61 Id. at 187-88.
62 Id. at 188.
63 Id. at 188-89.
64 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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As the Ninth Circuit held in Stonehill v. United States,65 if the United
States participates in ajoint venture with foreign officials or uses them
as agents to circumvent our law, U.S. constitutional protections must
still apply.66 This principle was specifically extended to the Fifth
Amendment in United States v. Bagaric67 If a foreign government
questioned a suspect independently of the United States, the results
would be admissible if the defendant was treated humanely,68 but
would in all likelihood be excluded under the court's supervisory
power if the foreign government's actions "shocked the conscience"
of the U.S. courts. 639 Information "extracted" by a foreign government
through physical or mental compulsion, therefore, would probably
not be admissible in the United States.
B. POW or Detainee?
If the courts are to hold, as in Bin Laden, that the Fifth Amend-
ment applies overseas, competing considerations of intelligence and
prosecution will make it extremely difficult to determine exactly how
U.S. officials should proceed with interrogation when Taliban, al
Qaeda, or terrorist suspects are captured. In analyzing the issue, how-
ever, it would appear that perhaps the threshold question to be an-
swered by the government should be whether or not the individuals in
custody should be labeled prisoners of war or detainees. Under the
Geneva Convention, "lawful combatants" in "a declared war or any
other armed conflict ... even if the state of war is not recognized by
one of [the parties]," should be classified as POWs. 711 POWs are not to
be prosecuted or punished for military acts they committed during
the war, and they are not to be incarcerated in jails or penitentiaries
except for disciplinary reasons.7 ' Accordingly, as a general rule,
POWs need not be given Miranda rights because they should not be
brought into the criminal justice system. On the other hand, individu-
als who violate the laws of war and who "do not meet the legal criteria
65 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968).
66 Id. at 743.
67 706 F.2d 42, 69 (2d Cir. 1983).
68 See United States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir. 1971) (allowing evi-
dence obtained through a vehicle search by Toronto police because their conduct
was not the type that would shock the conscience of our courts").
69 See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
that Fifth Amendment protections apply extraterritorially, even if the foreign state
does not recognize the protections).
70 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136.
71 Id. art. 22, 6 U.S.T. 3336, 3336, 75 U.N.T.S. 154, 154.
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of [POWs] under the [Geneva Convention]" may be unlawful combat-
ants and "termed detainees instead of [POWs]. "72 They may be prose-
cuted and jailed for their crimes and, therefore, may be eligible for
the protection of Miranda.
This does not mean it is necessarily always easy to determine
which category applies to a particular combatant. The facts can be
cloudy, and the law is still somewhat in dispute. For that reason, the
Geneva Convention provided for Article 5 tribunals to rule on a pris-
oner's status, 73 which tribunals in the United States are directed by
military lawyers associated with the Judge Advocate General.74 For ex-
ample, the original Geneva Convention ratified by the United States
classified as soldiers and potential POWs those who wear "fixed dis-
tinctive sign[s] recognizable at a distance," "carry[ ] arms openly,"
and conduct operations in accordance with the "laws of and customs
of war."75 The Geneva Protocols, 76 however, recognized that "there
are situations in armed conflict where, owing to the nature of the hos-
tilities an armed combatant can not so distinguish himself' 77 and
stated that, in such situations, "[an armed combatant] shall retain his
status as a combatant, provided that ... he carries his arms openly."78
These protocols have not been ratified by the United States in part
because of the removal of the requirement that combatants wear
some type of uniform or sign. But the Geneva Protocols have been
accepted by 150 countries and, arguably, carry the force of interna-
tional law.79 In addition, under U.S. criminal law, as noted in Part I,
an attack upon any U.S. facility with intent to coerce a civilian popula-
tion or influence a policy of government is a terrorist act subject to
72 INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEPT., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL,
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 22 (2002), at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNET
Internet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HAND-
BOOK].
73 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
70, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42.
74 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 22.
75 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
70, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
76 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
Jan. 23, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol II]; Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Jan. 23, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3.
77 Geneva Protocol II, supra note 76, sec. II, art. 44, 1 3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23.
78 Id.
79 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 11.
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prosecution and imprisonment."" However, under the Geneva Con-
vention, such an attack against a military target, as opposed to civil-
ians, might not be a violation of the laws of war,8 1 and, accordingly,
the perpetrators should be recognized as soldiers and POWs if cap-
tured. Those who bombed the U.S.S. Cole and the Khobar Towers
could thus potentially claim POW status. The same could be said of
Afghan fighters supporting the Taliban.
In the context of interrogation, and even detention, however, this
expanded reading of the Geneva Convention, while apparently con-
trary to U.S. policy, does not necessarily harm the United States. First,
as noted, if it is determined that a captured suspect has POW status,
Miranda is not an issue, and the suspect may be freely interrogated
without a lawyer. Moreover, once interrogation is complete, the indi-
vidual may possibly receive a "sentence" that is more effective than
most that could be given by a criminal court. As stated by Professor
Alfred Rubin of the Fletcher School of International Law and
Diplomacy:
Even if the "armed conflict" has not been declared .... those
soldiers who have not violated the international laws of war are still
"prisoners of war" until the cessation of active hostilities. The ques-
tions as to when those hostilities have actually ceased seems to be a
question best resolved by the [Article 5] tribunal, which need not
accept the word of a prisoner as to his future peaceful intentions.
There need be no special commissions, no criminal trials, no "con-
victions," to result in life in prison enlivened only by periodic Red
Cross visitations.
8 2
If our goals are (1) to interrogate suspects without telling them
that they do not have to talk and without providing a lawyer who may
obstruct the interests of government in order to protect his client, and
(2) to prevent terrorist suspects from committing future violent acts,
then Rubin's approach to determining a prisoner's status has obvious
appeal. It must be remembered, however, that this would only be a
partial solution. Those who violate the laws of war would not legally
qualify as POWs. They would be candidates for prosecution and, as
such, could retain Fifth Amendment rights.
80 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2000).
81 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at 10.
82 Alfred P. Rubin, Applying the Geneva Conventions: Military Commissions, Armed
Conflict, and Al-Qaeda, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 79, 81 (2002).
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C. Purpose of the Interrogation
If the government decides that a particular prisoner should not
be classified as a POW and should be subject to criminal prosecution,
the government could argue that Miranda and Fifth Amendment pro-
tections are irrelevant in the early stages of interrogation because the
questioning is not for law enforcement purposes. For example, if au-
thorities honestly intend to obtain and utilize the information for in-
telligence only, Miranda would not apply even if the subject is in
custody. As Judge Sand stated in United States v. Bin Laden:
To the extent that a suspect's Miranda rights allegedly impede for-
eign intelligence collection, we note that Miranda only prevents an
unwarned or involuntary statement from being used as evidence in
a domestic criminal trial; it does not mean that such statements are
never to be elicited in the first place.
83
This statement is consistent with other decisions holding that Mi-
randa warnings need not be given by custom officials while determin-
ing an immigrant's status,8 4 by psychiatrists during evaluation of
imprisoned convicts,85 or by social workers conducting an investiga-
tion.8
6
Truly voluntary statements made to intelligence agents may even
be admitted later in the defendant's criminal trial regardless of the
absence of warnings. For example, in United States v. Lonetrees 7 a
Marine guard who had committed espionage chose to brief CIA
agents in Vienna on his activities and voluntarily reported to them for
ten days before they turned him over to Naval Investigative Service law
enforcement agents.8 8 At trial, the CIA interviews were admitted be-
cause they were clearly voluntary and because the agents "analyzed
appellant's activities [only] for the purpose of ascertaining what dam-
age may have occurred to the security of the United States and not for
the purpose of perfecting a criminal prosecution."89
In Afghanistan, however, where FBI agents accompany intelli-
gence operatives, even a pure intelligence purpose may not guarantee
the evidentiary admission of an unwarned statement because Lonetree
relied in large part on the fact that "courts have found that non-police
83 United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
84 United States v. Layne, 973 F.2d 1417, 1420 (8th Cir. 1992).
85 United States v. Mitchell H., 182 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
86 United States v. Moreno, 36 M.J. 107, 112 (C.M.A. 1992).
87 35 M.J. 396 (C.M.A. 1992).
88 Id. at 399-400.
89 Id. at 404 (quoting United States v. Lonetree, 31 M.J. 849, 868 (N-M Ct. Crim
App. 1990)).
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agents do not exert the same coercive force or custodial constraint as
do law enforcement agents."901 Furthermore, in that case the intelli-
gence and law enforcement investigation had not "merged into an
indivisible entity" and the intelligence agents were in no way under
the guidance, direction, or control of law enforcement.9 1 Although
the exact facts surrounding the interrogations in Afghanistan and at
Guantanamo are unknown, it does appear that the prisoners are ques-
tioned in an atmosphere closer to a station house custodial interroga-
tion than to the repeated voluntary appearances of Lonetree. In
addition, the previously cited press reports indicating that the FBI and
CIA are working together9 2 necessarily raise the merger issue that was
not present in Lonetree.
The government could maintain that Miranda, nevertheless,
should not apply to questioning of suspected terrorists because the
purpose of the questioning is to immediately protect the public safety.
In New York v. Quarles,9.3 the Supreme Court created the "public safety"
exception to Miranda by authorizing both the questioning and the evi-
dentiary admission of the response when officers captured an armed
suspect in a grocery store and asked the suspect where he had con-
cealed the gun without reading him his rights9 4 Appellate courts
have since relied upon Quarles to permit questioning about the loca-
tion of weapons even if the defendant has asked for a lawyer.9 5 Intelli-
gence and law enforcement officials confronting terrorist suspects
immediately after they have been secured certainly have powerful rea-
sons to question the suspects to find out whether other terrorists or
weapons might be concealed nearby or whether a major attack is
about to take place. This questioning should be allowed under the
public safety exception. But, although the argument is worth making,
the government may not be able to generally rely on Quarles and its
progeny as carte blanche authority for the admission in criminal court
of the results of a lengthy interrogation without Fifth Amendment
protections. This is because the facts of the cited public safety excep-
tion cases all relate to brief questions regarding an imminent identifi-
able threat. Currently, no precedent exists for extending the
90 Id.
91 Id. at 403 (quoting United States v. Penn, 39 C.M.R. 194, 199 (C.M.A. 1969)).
92 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
93 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
94 Id. at 656.
95 See United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 692-94 (4th Cir. 1994) (reasoning
that the danger to public safety persists after the defendant has asked for a lawyer);
United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).
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exception to admission of the results of detailed probing into long-
term dangers.
Questioning for reasons of intelligence or public safety of poten-
tial prosecution targets would likely presage a lengthy interrogation by
law enforcement agents specifically designed to elicit incriminating ev-
idence for use at the trial of the defendant and his co-conspirators.
This follow-up questioning is generally accompanied by oral, written,
and signed Miranda waivers. These waivers, however, do not guaran-
tee evidentiary admission of a defendant's subsequent confession by
cleaning up all problems that might be associated with the initial gov-,
ernment interrogation. This is because the defense would probably
argue that, in his client's mind, "the cat was out of the bag" once he
responded to the earlier unwarned intelligence questioning and he,
therefore, saw nothing to be gained by refusing to answer later ques-
tions by law enforcement. The Supreme Court addressed this issue at
length in Oregon v. Elstad.96 There the Court held that a prior, un-
warned statement would not automatically require the suppression of
a later confession secured after the defendant knowingly waived his
rights, 97 if the initial statement was voluntary and was not the product
of coercion or other deliberate means calculated to break a suspect's
will. 98  Involuntary unwarned statements still could taint later
Mirandized confessions. In that event, the government would only be
allowed to admit the defendant's subsequent statement if it could be
demonstrated that (1) the statement was voluntary, (2) the statement
was not obtained by using the earlier statement, or (3) there was no
causal connection between the two statements.99 As a practical mat-
ter, these requirements could prove to be a difficult burden to over-
come both because of the likelihood of shared information and the
defendant's belief that he had already confessed to the authorities.
D. Torture
Before leaving the subject of interrogation, some reference
must be made to the possibility of torturing captured terrorist sus-
pects to obtain critical information. This subject was addressed
before September l1th by A.L. DeWitt 00 and the present au-
96 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
97 Id. at 312.
98 Id. at 313 n.3.
99 United States v. Delvalle, 55 M.J. 648, 653 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (citing
United States v. Pownall, 42 M.J. 682 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1995)).
100 See generally A.L. Dewitt, The Ultimate Exigent Circumstance, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 169 (1996) (arguing that necessity may justify the use of torture in terrorist
situations).
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thor 0 1 before Alan Dershowitz made the subject fashionable by going
public with the existing legal theory on the matter. 10 2 Without re-
hashing what was written in the prior articles, a few key points need to
be reemphasized. First, in a situation where terrorists have knowledge
of the imminent deployment of a weapon of mass destruction, torture
must be considered. It is understood that international conventions,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 103 and
the Convention Against Torture,1 1 14 prohibit torture, 10 5 but interna-
tional agreements also recogrqize the importance of the State protect-
ing the life of its citizens. 10 6 Arguably, a nation-state which did not
coerce one terrorist in order to save hundreds of thousands of people
would be abandoning its duty to its citizens.107 Second, although gov-
ernment agents may escape civil liability under a common law defense
of necessity, it would be far better for the legislature to outline a pro-
tocol for torture, requiring the emergency approval of a judge orjudi-
cial panel before the torture is undertaken. Finally, because of the
constitutional prohibition, as well as the generally accepted belief that
the product of coercive interrogation is unreliable, the courts would
never allow evidence obtained by torture to be used in any way by law
enforcement to convict a defendant. To the extent that torture is con-
sistent with the successful pursuit of a war and the protection of the
population, it would be folly not to employ it under appropriate con-
trols to avoid a devastating attack. But, in essence, the subject of tor-
ture is an intelligence and prophylactic matter suitable only to a state
101 Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the Twenty-First Century Terrorist Threat Within the Scope
of Twentieth Centuy Constitutional Law, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1421, 1460-63 (2000) (argu-
ing that torture could be justified in rare circumstances based on an extension of the
common-law necessity defense or of the public-policy exception to Miranda).
102 See Morse, supra note 44, at 44.
103 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, S. ExEC.
Doc. No. 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
104 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment,June 26, 1987, S. TREATv Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.
85.
105 Id. S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 1, 5, (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 103, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 95-2,
at Part E, 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
106 See generally DJ. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHrs, 37-54 (1995) (discussing the various protections of human life given in inter-
national agreements).
107 This proposition has been argued in Tamar Beyth-Sharon, Permissible Interro-
gation Methods in the War Against Terrorism: The Ticking Time Bomb Dilemma,
(Apr. 2002) (unpublished student paper, on file at the University of Texas School of
Law).
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of war. The results of torture would not contribute significantly to law
enforcement and prosecution.
E. Conclusion
The application of the Fifth Amendment to extraterritorial inter-
rogation of terrorist suspects is highly problematic for those interested
in combating terrorism in the courts. Prosecutors can only hope that
a subject knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights from the start if
they want to guarantee the admission of the results later. Recitation
of these rights and provision of lawyers is not, however, consistent with
efficient military and intelligence work. The government can legiti-
mately argue that unwarned statements should be admitted in court
because the questioners were motivated by intelligence and public
safety concerns. The government can further argue that later
Mirandized questioning removes the taint from what has gone before.
But it is far from certain that these arguments will prevail. If pending
cases encounter serious difficulty due to Fifth Amendment objections
as they proceed from trial to appellate court review, the government
will have additional reason to reevaluate the efficacy of a law enforce-
ment approach to the war on terrorism.
IV. EVIDENCE COLLECTION
A. Crime Scene Scenario
The basic question of how government authorities should collect
evidence on the scene in such foreign locales as Afghanistan, the Phil-
ippines, and Pakistan once again highlights the conflict between the
law enforcement and military cultures that has been depicted
throughout this Article. The primary goal of a military or civilian in-
telligence organization, especially during war, is to quickly obtain
credible information that can immediately be shared with policy mak-
ers to assist them in selecting the best options available. Law enforce-
ment, on the other hand, needs to meticulously accumulate evidence
that can withstand the myriad challenges to admissibility posed by the
judicial system in an effort to convict the guilty parties. A short hypo-
thetical will illustrate the problems naturally created in the area of
evidence collection by these two separate missions.
Picture a situation in which indigenous Philippine armed forces
hear rumors in a village that an al Qaeda guerrilla leader named Juan
Cavazos and his associates occupy a particular nearby cave and that
they intend to launch a chemical attack against U.S. facilities. The
Philippine army, accompanied by U.S. Special Forces, approaches the
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area and receives fire from a cave opening. They respond with a se-
ries of high explosive rockets fired directly into the cave. Shortly
thereafter, the surviving guerillas surrender, and the troops discover
in the cave the remains of documents and vials of unidentified white
powder. Cavazos is not present. Interrogation proceeds (with all the
issues identified in the previous section) while Philippine soldiers in-
spect the documents and gingerly view the chemicals. When they are
completed, the military packs up what they have found and destroys
the entrance to the cave, so it cannot be used again. The documents
and chemicals are sent up the chain of command through uncount-
able hands to the battalion commander. He reviews the material and
finds drawings of the floor plan and duct system of the U.S. Embassy.
He sends the chemicals to the nearest military or local government
lab. Tests indicate that anthrax spores are present in the powder.
These findings result in a U.S. intelligence report to Washington and
the White House (with headlines in the Washington Post) that Juan
Cavazos and his organization have been planning an anthrax attack
on the U.S. Embassy. U.S. Special Forces redouble their efforts to
find Cavazos and eventually capture him. The U.S. government an-
nounces that he will be brought to justice.
FBI agents and prosecutors examining the Cavazos case will now
find that what was sufficient to generate a highly credible intelligence
report to the President falls far short of justifying a criminal prosecu-
tion. Moreover, the steps taken by the army in its assault on the cave,
while successful from a military standpoint, were extremely counter-
productive from the perspective of law enforcement. First, the rumors
from the village that originally stimulated the interest of the military
are probably hearsay and, in all likelihood, will not have been docu-
mented in reports giving a particular villager's name, his statement,
and how he knows the truth of any information he might have con-
veyed to the military. Any fingerprints that Cavazos left on the recov-
ered documents will probably have been destroyed by the heat and
fire of the rocket blasts, by the rummaging through the material by
the troops in the cave, or by the examination of officers up the chain
of command. The chemicals also passed through numerous hands
and the chances of recreating an evidentiary chain of custody in a
system unaccustomed to making reports of such a transfer is probably
impossible. The lab tests may be unreliable because the lab techni-
cians may have been untrained by U.S. standards, may not have been
familiar with anthrax, and may not have performed all required tests.
In essence, the United States may have Cavazos in custody but may
have no physical evidence connecting him to the crime scene. Also,
absent credible cooperation from co-conspirators, the United States
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may have very little to show a jury that he is the leader of a group
planning an attack on U.S. facilities.
Reviewing this scenario, prosecutors would know that if law en-
forcement had been in charge of the operation, officers would have
taken independent reports from all villagers, with an emphasis on
finding a solid witness with personal knowledge; would have attacked
the caves with tear gas, not rockets; and would have completely
cordoned off the area once the guerillas had surrendered. Search
teams would have combed through the cave for hours, placing evi-
dence in marked and sealed plastic bags. A special effort would have
been made to look for hair, fibers, objects containing DNA, and any-
thing else that would tie Cavazos to the complex. All findings would
have been sent with the shortest possible chain of custody to highly
qualified labs in the United States.
The problems created by these different approaches are not
solved by simply having FBI agents accompany the military as they
have done in Afghanistan because, at each point during the opera-
tion, decisions have to be made, and they have to be made by an indi-
vidual from the group-law enforcement or military-in charge.
That is, the government attacks the cave with rockets, or it does not;
the government relies on indigenous military forces like the Northern
Alliance and Philippine military or it does not; military intelligence
acts quickly to collect and read documents or it does not; the military
seals the cave immediately to deny its use to additional guerillas, or it
does not. In this context, the reader may recall pfess reports that
when the FBI assault team at Waco moved cars from in front of the
Branch Davidian headquarters the FBI evidence teams vehemently ob-
jected because this action irretrievably destroyed critical bullet trajec-
tory evidence. 0 8 When there are irreconcilable conflicts, you cannot
have it both ways, and, in the final analysis, decisions must be made by
the one group or organization which everyone understands to have
the preeminent role in the anti-terrorist effort.
B. Search and Seizure
1. Extraterritorial Searches Against Foreign Nationals
As our military forces and federal agents search the caves, houses,
and apartments of terrorist suspects outside the United States, the
agents are fortunate not to be bound in most cases by Fourth Amend-
ment rules demanding a warrant and probable cause. The agents are
108 Special Agent Byron Sage, Presentation Before U.S. Law and Nat'l Security
Class (Feb. 27, 2001).
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free from such restrictions whether they are motivated by a need for
intelligence or a desire to prosecute. They are free because the Su-
preme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez held that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to intrusions directed against foreign nationals outside
the territorial limits of the United States. 109 Verdugo-Urquidez involved
a law enforcement search of the residence of a major drug traf-
ficker.llI It was clear, however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist was think-
ing of potential spillover into military operations when he drew a
bright line against further extension of the Fourth Amendment. As
he stated:
The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals [applying the Fourth
Amendment to the search of a foreign citizen's residence in Mex-
ico] would apply not only to law enforcement operations abroad,
but also to other foreign policy operations which might result in
"searches or seizures." The United States frequently employs
Armed Forces outside this country-over 200 times in our history-
for the protection of American citizens or national security. Appli-
cation of the Fourth Amendment to those circumstances could sig-
nificantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to
foreign situations involving our national interest.1 '
2. Extraterritorial Searches Against U.S. Citizens for Intelligence
Purposes
A number of terrorist suspects have obtained American citizen-
ship. The Supreme Court cases, as Judge Sand recently wrote in
United States v. Bin Laden, still "suggest that the Fourth Amendment
applies to United States citizens abroad."'112 As authority, he cited
Reid v. Covert for the proposition that the shield provided to American
citizens by the Bill of Rights should not be stripped away simply be-
cause the citizens are in a foreign land. 1 3 He also cited Verdugo-Ur-
quidez's rejection of the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim
because he was not one of Athe people" with "substantial connec-
tions" to the United States.' 1 4 But how are searches and seizures
against citizens overseas to be conducted, especially when U.S. courts
have no power to issue warrants outside the United States?"
I5
109 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
110 Id. at 262.
III [d. at 273-74 (citations omitted).
112 United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
113 Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957)).
114 Id. (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, 271).
115 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274.
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Bin Laden addressed this question in the context of physical and
electronic searches in Kenya authorized by the Attorney General
against a U.S. citizen in an effort to obtain intelligence on the bin
Laden organization.' 16 Executive Order 12,333 empowers the Attor-
ney General to
approve the use for intelligence purposes .... against a United.
States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would
be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided
that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney
General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to
believe that the technique is directed towards a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.' 17
Congress, however, had "not addressed the issue of foreign intel-
ligence collection which occurs abroad,"1 and "the Supreme
Court .. .remained .. .essentially silent on both aspects of the is-
sue." 9 The court, therefore, had to determine the constitutionality
of an intelligence search against U.S. citizens conducted without statu-
tory authority or judicial approval.1
2
1
Proceeding in unchartered waters, Judge Sand reasoned that
prior to the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) in 1978 authorizing courts to issue warrants for domestic (but
not foreign) intelligence operations, 121 courts had generally "affirmed
the existence of a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant re-
quirement for searches . . .which target[ed] foreign powers or their
agents.' 122 This affirmation was based in part on the President's con-
stitutional authority in foreign affairs.' 2" FISA had since established
clearjudicial procedures with respect to domestic searches, but, in the
absence of further congressional guidance, the foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement must still exist for foreign
searches. In addition, the "special needs" cases, such as Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executive Ass'n 124 and Camara v. Municipal Court,'25 had rec-
116 See Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
117 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, at 59,951 (Dec. 8, 1981).
118 Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 273-88.
121 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1829 (West Supp.
2002).
122 Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
123 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (establish-
ing that the President is the sole organ of the nation in the international field).
124 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (stating that the government's interest in railroad
safety creates a "special need" that may justify departure from normal warrant
procedures).
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ognized that "when the imposition of a warrant requirement proves to
be a disproportionate and perhaps even disabling burden on [the
safety and security responsibilities of] the Executive, a warrant should
not be required."'12 Accordingly, the search of the defendant U.S.
citizen's residence in Kenya for intelligence purposes was
constitutional.
It should be noted that the defendant in Bin Laden complained
not only that the United States had conducted a search for intelli-
gence purposes but also that the government was utilizing the evi-
dence it had obtained against him in a criminal prosecution. This
potentially carried the search out of the realm of the "foreign intelli-
gence exception" into the more restricted domain of criminal search
and seizure. This same issue had, in fact, been raised numerous times
in appeals of domestic searches under FISA. As FISA warrants can
arguably be obtained by the government with less evidence than they
must produce to secure a traditional criminal search warrant or Title
III wire interception,12 7 defense attorneys have often suspected that
the government might be utilizing FISA to circumvent the more strin-
gent criminal search demands of the Fourth Amendment. 28 There
has been no proof of these claims, but concern over the allegations
led the Department of Justice to seal off its intelligence sections from
the Criminal Division to such a degree that the first time the Depart-
125 387 U.S. 523, 533-34 (1967) (recognizing a special needs exception but find-
ing the exception inapplicable to administrative searches because the warrant re-
quirement does not frustrate the purpose of the search).
126 Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
127 See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787 passim (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding
the less-demanding requirements for searches of foreign entities set out in FISA and
citing authority); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913-17 (4th Cir.
1980) (finding that conducting searches in a foreign intelligence context requires
only reasonableness). Search warrants are authorized only where there is probable
cause to believe a particular place contains evidence of a crime. Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c); Steele v. United States,
267 U.S. 498, 501 (1925) (requiring a warrant "to particularly identify" the place to be
searched). Title III wire interceptions also require probable cause to believe that a
particular phone is being used by a specific person to commit a named crime. 18
U.S.C. §§ 2511-2522 (2000). FISA essentially only requires probable cause to believe
that the target is an agent of a foreign power. See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1804-1811 (West
Supp. 2002).
128 See United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
knowledge that FISA will make admission of evidence in a criminal trial easier does
not pose any problem as long as the primary purpose of the search was foreign intelli-
gence); Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 790-91; United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 71-74
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that FISA requirements fully comply with the Fourth
Anendment).
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ment of Justice Criminal Division heard about the Wen Ho Lee espio-
nage investigation was when the case was reported in the Wall Street
JournaL129 Theoretically, the entire issue is another example of the
difficulties faced both here and abroad with attempts to gather "intel-
ligence" for a war and "evidence" for law enforcement.
In the present author's opinion, however, to date, this particular
question has been far more speculative than real. There is no evi-
dence in the cases that the domestic espionage and terrorism FISA
investigations prior to September 11th were motivated from the start
by anything but a desire for intelligence information. Accordingly,
any criminal evidence obtained incidental to the intelligence surveil-
lance has been generally admitted. 30 In Bin Laden, Judge Sand also
recognized that the foreign searches authorized by the Attorney Gen-
eral were motivated purely by the need for intelligence. The motion
to suppress the evidence, therefore, was denied. BothJudge Sand and
the other courts examining this issue have understood that the gov-
ernment has always foreseen the possibility that a prosecution may re-
sult down the road.13 ' But prosecution has not been the focus of
government actions at the time of the search nor the probability that
it may become in the years ahead.
3. Extraterritorial Searches Against U.S. Citizens for Criminal
Prosecution
If the United States embarks on an investigation against a terror-
ist suspect who is a U.S. citizen, fully expecting to accumulate suffi-
cient evidence to try and convict him, it is an entirely different matter
than for the United States to initiate a search for intelligence pur-
poses. Criminal investigations may arise more frequently if we view
the war on terrorism as a global law enforcement operation. Outside
of the United States, Verdugo-Urquidez holds that Fourth Amendment
protections do not apply to searches against foreign citizens. 3 2 But if
the goal is prosecution, and the suspect is a U.S. citizen located
outside the territory of the United States, we are once more thrown
into somewhat unchartered waters, similar, but adjacent, to those en-
129 See Final Report: Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory Investigation 688 (May 2000), available at www.usdoj.
gov/ag/readingroom/bellows.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
130 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311 (1936) (admit-
ting evidence of arms sales); Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (explaining the foreign
intelligence exception and citing authority).
131 Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (finding that foreseeable use of evidence in
criminal prosecution does not bar the use of FISA).
132 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
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countered by Judge Sand in Bin Laden. Judge Sand's ruling in Bin
Laden was confined to extraterritorial intelligence searches against
U.S. citizens. I"" He did not have to confront the question of how the
United States should proceed overseas if its primary aim were undeni-
ably criminal prosecution. The Ninth Circuit had this opportunity in
1995 in United States v. Barona,'13 4 and the result was a highly conten-
tious split decision.
Barona involved six high-level cocaine traffickers who were discov-
ered during a major worldwide drug investigation labeled "Operation
Pisces."'!'35 Three of the traffickers had U.S. citizenship.' 3 6 The Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) traced the defendants to Copenhagen
and prevailed on the authorities there to obtain wiretaps on their ho-
tel phones.':3 7 The wiretaps resulted in the interception of numerous
incriminating conversations.' 3 8 There was no question that the Dan-
ish wiretaps were a joint venture initiated at the request of the United
States.'39 As a result, the court applied Fourth Amendment principles
to the appellants with U.S. citizenship.4' The parties debated the ap-
plication of these principles. In the majority opinion, written by Chief
Judge Wallace, the court held that "compliance with foreign law alone
determines whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment."'
14'
If the government adhered to the host nation's law and that law did
not "shock the conscience," the government's actions were "reasona-
ble." "42 The Fourth Amendment, stating the people shall be secure
from "unreasonable searches," '4 demands nothing more. 144 Proba-
ble cause, as that term is understood in American jurisprudence, is
not required' 45 because the Fourth Amendment only states only that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause"'14" and the Su-
preme Court had already acknowledged in Verdugo-Urquidez that U.S.
warrants could not be issued for overseas searches. 
147
133 Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
134 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
135 Id. at 1089-90.
136 Id. at 1094.
137 Id. at 1090.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1094.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1091 n.1.
142 Id. at 1091-96.
143 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
144 Barona, 56 F.3d at 1093.
145 d. at 1091-92 n.].
146 Id. at 1092 n.j (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
147 Id. (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990)).
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Judge Reinhardt vigorously dissented in language quite harsh for
an appellate court opinion, stating that:
The majority's cavalier treatment of a well-reasoned explication by
this court concerning the question before us suggests that panel
composition, not persuasive legal analysis, has determined the re-
sult in this case .... [T]here is no sound basis in law for the major-
ity's failure to analyze the relevant legal authorities properly.1
48
In Judge Reinhardt's opinion, probable cause was an indispensa-
ble element of the Fourth Amendment, and Judge Wallace had
stripped "this important principle of all significance by holding that
we must look exclusively to foreign law when determining whether the
search violates the Fourth Amendment."'' 49 Without probable cause,
any U.S. citizen traveling outside the nation's boundaries would be
fair game for wiretapping and surreptitious searches "whenever mem-
bers of the CIA, the DEA, the FBI, or who knows how many other
alphabet law enforcement agencies[] so desire."'151 Although U.S.
courts cannot issue warrants abroad, there was no reason why in a
criminal case conducted in the United States a federal agent should
not be required to explain to a U.S. judge the facts that justified a
search against our citizens.
Despite the strength of the dissent, Barona was not heard en banc
or accepted for review by the Supreme Court. 51 As of the date of this
writing Barona has yet to be questioned by any other court. The case,
therefore, stands, by a two-to-one margin, for the proposition that
prosecution-motivated searches may be conducted by U.S. authorities
outside the United States against U.S. citizens without probable cause.
But Barona still demands that the United States at least comply in
good faith with foreign law. If the reasoning of the dissent is adopted
by other courts, the government might even be forced to comply with
more traditional Fourth Amendment law. In either case, our armed
forces and intelligence agents could potentially face difficult legal ob-
stacles in attempting to conduct foreign searches against terrorist sus-
pects who are American citizens where our clear intent is criminal
prosecution.
4. Domestic Search and Seizure
As previously noted, if the United States locates terrorist suspects
inside our borders, it may rely upon FISA to conduct intelligence-re-
148 Id. at 1105 & n.15.
149 Id. at 1099.
150 Id.
151 Barona v. United States, 516 U.S. 1092 (1996).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
lated wiretaps1'5 2 or physical searches.' 5  The Act requires only that
the government certify to the court that the information sought is for-
eign intelligence information and establish probable cause that the
target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.' 54 In the case of
a U.S. citizen, the government must demonstrate that the certifica-
tions are "not clearly erroneous."'
55
The above-mentioned challenges to use of FISA evidence in later
criminal prosecutions signaled the need for a change in the language
of the statute if FISA evidence was going to be used increasingly to
prosecute terrorists. Accordingly, in 2001, the Patriot Act1 56 changed
the provision requiring that the surveillance be primarily for intelli-
gence purposes to state that a "significant purpose" of the intrusion
must be to obtain intelligence information. 157 Theoretically, a related
and later "significant purpose" of criminal prosecution will not affect
the use of the material collected. 58 However, to the extent that FISA
demands something less than a criminal search warrant, it is essential
that the statute retain its design for use, first and foremost, as an intel-
ligence tool. 1 59 FISA will then be able to maintain its constitutional
underpinnings as "special needs" legislation and as part of the foreign
152 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811 (West
Stipp. 2002).
153 Id. §§ 1821-1829.
154 Id. § 1804(a) (electronic surveillance); id. § 1823(a) (physical searches).
155 Id. § 1804(a) (5) (electronic surveillance); id. § 1824(a) (5) (physical searches).
156 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 8, 12, 15, 18, 22, 28, 31, 42, 47, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
157 Id., 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1804(A) (7) (B), 1823(A) (7) (B).
158 Id.
159 This issue was highlighted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's
opinion and order of May 17, 2002. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court, No. 02-429, 2002 WL 31017386, at *1-2 (Foreign Intel.
Surv. Ct. May 17, 2002). The court mentioned that, in the past, intelligence agents
had shared information with criminal investigators without following proper proce-
dures. Id. at *8-9. There was no indication in the opinion, however, that this was the
result of criminal agents or prosecutors using FISA to deliberately circumvent the
requirements of Title III. More importantly, the court rejected the DOJ's new intelli-
gence sharing procedures because of concerns that provisions allowing criminal inves-
tigators and prosecutors to "advise" intelligence officials regarding the initiation and
operation of FISA searches could lead to prosecutorial "direction and control" of
FISA searches in violation of Title III. Id. at *12. The court ordered that, although
consultation between intelligence and criminal divisions was allowed, the FBI and the
DOJ must insure that prosecutors did not use FISA to enhance criminal prosecution.
Id. at *14.
In the first ever opinion by a designated FISA appellate court, the FISA court's
order was reversed on November 14, 2002. In re Sealed Case, No. 02-001, 2002 WL
31548122 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. of Review Sept. 9, 2002). It is unknown at this date
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intelligence exception to traditional Fourth Amendment
requirements.
If the government's goal is prosecution, then officials must ad-
here to the strict rules governing search warrants and Title III inter-
ceptions. 16" The rules currently apply whether the target is a foreign
national or U.S. citizen.'"' However, we must question whether these
protections should shield a foreign national who enters the United
States with intent to commit a terrorist act. Does he have "substantial
connections" if he is here less than thirty days? Even if he is present
longer, is he one of the people of the national community the Fourth
Amendment was meant to protect? If the government emphasizes
criminal prosecution in terrorist cases, courts will likely be forced to
address these questions in the years to come.
1 62
C. Discoveiy
Military and intelligence operatives routinely collect intelligence
through covert means to support policy decisions. As a general rule,
the operatives have no concern that any material they have secured
through sensitive sources and methods will be delivered to the enemy
or his representatives. Law enforcement officers, however, under-
stand that, with rare exception, virtually every item of relevant evi-
dence they collect must be given to the defendant and his attorney.
As the FBI painstakingly constructs formal criminal cases against ter-
rorist suspects, it must necessarily turn to the intelligence community
for guidance and information. The CIA, NSA, Defense Intelligence
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and others are the govern-
mental organizations with the international contacts and expertise in-
whether the opinion will be appealed further by the FISA court with the assistance of
the ACLU, which filed a brief as amicus curiae.
160 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (dictating procedures for the interception of wire, oral, and
electronic communications); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (establishing procedures for con-
ducting a warrantless search and for obtaining a search warrant).
161 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
162 This issue was raised in an immigration case. See United States v. Guitterez, 983
F. Supp. 905, 914-16 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (surveying Supreme Court precedent, includ-
ing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), before finding that a non-
citizen has Fourth Amendment standing), rev'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir.
1999). In Guitterez, the court refused to deny Fourth Amendment rights to an illegal
alien in the United States in part because Chief Justice Rehnquist's statements in
Verdugo-Urquidez, were dicta and part of the plurality opinion. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp.
at 915 (noting that Verdugo-Urquidez did not hold that an alien must demonstrate sub-
stantial connections with the United States, while articulating the standard that the
Ninth Circuit "does not construe Supreme Court plurality decisions as binding
precedent").
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valuable to determining exactly who committed a particular crime.
But in the process of reaching out to these agencies for assistance, the
FBI can potentially expose and even destroy critical resources.
A specific example will serve to illustrate the potential pitfalls at-
tendant to what is sometimes necessary cooperation between law en-
forcement and the intelligence community. Imagine that the NSA has
identified the cell phone number of a particular terrorist and, after a
series of tests, has penetrated the encryption device that he uses
alongside the phone. The NSA intercepts a series of calls in which the
leader directs two subordinates to commit an attack on a civilian facil-
ity in a large city. The attack is completed before it can be prevented,
and the FBI contacts the intelligence community for help. The NSA
advises the FBI of the interceptions, and, after further investigation,
the FBI arrests the two interceptees as well as a third suspect outside a
local residence. Obtaining probable cause through consent or other
sources, the FBI searches the residence and finds evidence linking all
three to the crime. The three suspects are indicted.'
What is likely to follow from this scenario? As the U.S. prosecutor
(cleared for national security information) reviews files and interviews
witnesses in preparation for trial, he will learn of the intercepts that
broke the case. Because the intercepts are terrific evidence and will
guarantee a conviction, he would naturally ask the NSA for permission
to use them in court. The CIA, NSA, and DOD would all strenuously
object because use of the intercepts could expose that those agencies
are monitoring the leader's phone calls. The Director of Central In-
telligence (DCI), who has final responsibility, is likely to decide
against release of the information for use in the prosecution's case-in-
chief.
Though the intelligence community may prevail on the merits in
this initial dispute, the intercepts may still be disclosed to the defense
under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.16 Rule 16
mandates that the government turn over to the defense not only the
evidence it will use in its case in chief but also (1) recorded statements
of the defendant in the care, custody, or control of the government,
(2) books, documents, papers, and other tangible objects which are
material to the preparation of the defense, and (3) any results of sci-
entific tests or experiments which are material to the preparation of
the defense. 6
4
163 See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
164 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a), (c), (d).
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The obligation to produce evidence material to the preparation
of the defense is a reflection of the demand in Brady v. Maryland
165
that the United States provide the defense with all exculpatory evi-
dence. 166 In most cases the government can argue that it is not re-
quired to search all intelligence agency files for any trace of such
information unless the agency has "aligned" itself with the Depart-
ment of Justice during the criminal investigation. 167 The government
can even maintain that intelligence leads and tip; not utilized by law
enforcement in search warrants, arrest warrants, and indictments
should not subject intelligence agency files to discovery. 168 In the fac-
tual scenario presented, however, the NSA possibly aligned itself with
the investigation and the NSA's information also contains "recorded
statements of the defendant" and potentially exculpatory evidence be-
cause the third suspect is not included in the intercepted calls. Thus,
the DCI may win out in the beginning by forbidding the prosecutor to
use the evidence in his case, but the DCI may eventually be required
to hand over the information. As Daniel Richard says on the Brady
problem, "Thig' loss of control presents a tremendous threat to the
CIA and makes CIA officials leery about supporting a tasking policy
that encourages greater cooperation with the Department of Justice
and exposes them to being 'aligned' with the prosecution."
1 69
Once it appears that the information may have to be turned over
to the defense, the government would seek in camera judicial review
under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to prevent its
public disclosure.17 1 CIPA permits the government, with the court's
approval, to delete specified items of classified information, to sum-
marize the information, or to admit relevant facts that the informa-
tion would tend to prove. 17 1 The tactic has worked in a number of
sensitive cases, such as United States v. Noriega172 and United States v.
165 373 U.S. 83.
166 Id. at 88.
167 See Dan Richard, Overseas Tasking of the CIA for Domestic Law Enjorcement, NAT'L
SEC. STUD. Q., Summer 1996, at 1, 12 (citing United States ex rel. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386,
391 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
168 Commission on Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Com-
munity, cited in Richard, supra note 167, at 13.
169 Id. at 12-13.
170 Classified Information Procedures Act § 6, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 3 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2002); see also Richard, supra note 167, at 11-13 (describing in camera review).
171 Classified Information Procedures Act § 4.
172 117 F.3d 1206, 1215-17 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding trial court's exclusion,
under CIPA, of classified information because the probative value was marginal).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
North.173 But the tactic is not foolproof, as illustrated by the scenario
provided. Specifically, defense attorneys would probably demand to
know the particulars of the actual cell phone intercepts to insure that
their clients were talking to a terrorist leader. In addition, they would
probably want to know how the government penetrated the encryp-
tion device and documented proof of the test on the decryption ma-
chine to guarantee that the recordings actually reflected the exact
words spoken by the defendants. All of this, of course, the defense
attorneys would probably share with their clients. These are not illogi-
cal requests from a defensive perspective, and the court may feel com-
pelled to grant them. The government, on the other hand, has
overwhelming reasons not to comply. The outcome mandated by
CIPA could be dismissal of charges or of the entire case. 174
Although cooperation between the intelligence community and
law enforcement is often essential, 175 the intelligence community
must be allowed to continue to protect highly sensitive information.
The government has been working for several years to formulate pro-
cedures whereby both law enforcement and intelligence can cooper-
ate without undue damage to the mission of either. But it must be
understood that aggressive use of the civilian courts for criminal pros-
ecution as part of our anti-terrorism effort will probably at some point
expose invaluable intelligence sources and methods. If trials are in-
deed necessary, part of the solution may be widespread use of military
commissions.
V. MILITARY COMMISSIONS
On November 13, 2001, President Bush ai'thorized the creation
of military commissions with an order titled, "Detention, Treatment
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism."'176
The sound reasons for this order were set forth in part by the subse-
quent American Bar Association report on military commissions: 177
U.S. civilian courts, federal or state, would have jurisdiction to try
war crimes and other offenses under various criminal statutes. Ma-
173 708 F. Supp. 389, 397-98 (D.D.C. 1988) (calling "mistaken" defendant's claim
that he was entitled to use classified material in his defense without apprising the
court of its significance as required under CIPA).
174 Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(e) (2).
175 See Richard, supra note 167, at 4-5 (describing cooperation in the investiga-
tions of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International and the Banca Nazionale
Del Lavoro).
176 Military Order, supra note 7.
177 ABA TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2002) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
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jor concerns with the exercise of such jurisdiction centers on secur-
ity. This includes the physical security of the courthouse and the
participants... in the trial. It also includes the ability to safeguard
classified information, including intelligence sources and methods
whose compromise could facilitate future terrorist acts. While
mechanisms exist to protect evidence of a classified nature from
public exposure [i.e., CIPA], these may not suffice to protect the
information from the defendants and, through them, others who
may use such information to the harm of the United States and its
citizens.
1 78
In his testimony before Congress, retired Judge Advocate General
of the Army, Major General Michael Nardotti cited the above reasons
as justification for military tribunals.179 He also cited the need to have
"due regard for the practical necessity to use as evidence information
obtained in the course of a military operation rather than through
traditional law enforcement means."1 8°1 These statements highlight
the previously noted evidence collection and discovery problems' 8 '
that the government will experience if it adheres to a law enforcement
approach to the war on terrorism.
Although the military commission announcement raised a media
furor, 18 2 the announcement was supported not only by logic but also
by law and historical precedent. The Constitution gives Congress the
power to provide for the common defense and to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations. 8 3 In Article 21 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice,S 4 "Congress has explicitly provided, so far as
it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdic-
tion to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate
178 Id. at 14.
179 Department ofJustice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Ter-
rorism Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Judici-
ary Comm., 107th Cong., 2001 WL 26188000, at *1 (statement of Major General
Michael Nardotti, former Judge Advocate General, United States Army), reprinted in
ARMY LAW., Mar. 2001, at 1, 4.
180 Id.
181 See supra Part IV.
182 Tyrangiel, supra note 4; see also William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y.
TiDMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31.
183 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
184 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
reads
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do
not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals
of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by stat-
ute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts,
or other military tribunals.
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cases."' 185 The September llth attacks were part of a war that bin
Laden had long prosecuted against the United States and violated the
laws of war because they deliberately targeted non-combatant civil-
ians. 18" Although some have argued that the United States must be
engaged in a declared war to utilize military tribunals, the Supreme
Court has long recognized that a state of war may exist without a for-
mal declaration.187 Military commissions have previously "been used
in hostilities in which there was no declaration of war, including the
Civil War and the Indian Wars."' 88
The President's order states that an individual tried before a mili-
tary commission may not seek a remedy by means of an appeal to a
civilian court. 18 9 This same language was contained in past orders,
but the Supreme Court has traditionally reviewed applications for
habeas corpus in such cases. Such review requires that the rules em-
ployed by the commission comply with basic due process principles of
fundamental fairness for the procedure to be sustained. The order
sets forth a general outline of the rules, directing a "full and fair trial,"
"admission of such evidence as would . . .have probative value to a
reasonable person," and the protection of classified information
through control of the admission and access to such information as
well as the closure of the proceedings. 191 The Secretary of Defense
subsequently issued detailed regulations fulfilling these requirements.
The regulations provided that defendants would be presumed inno-
cent and must be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt by a two-thirds
vote of a seven-member commission."v ' Defendants would be pro-
tected against self-incrimination and would have the right to obtain
Id. Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was adopted verbatim from
Article 15 of the Articles of War. See Timothy Maconnel, Militay Commnissions and
Court Martials, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at 20-21.
185 ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) (construing the Articles of War passed by
Congress during the Second World War); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-9
(1946) (discussing the Court's ruling in Ex parte Quilin).
186 See ABA REPORT, supra note 177, at 7 & n.14.
187 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667-70 (1862) (noting that the Civil War
was no less a war because of the absence of a declaration); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4
DalI.) 35 passim (1800) (noting that although a declaration of war was not made, in
1799 the United States and France were in a situation of "a qualified maritime war").
188 ABA REPORT, supra note 177, at 5.
189 Military Order, supra note 7, at 57,835-36.
190 ld. at 57,835.
191 See Vernon Loeb, Runsfeld Announces New Military Tfibunal Rules, WAsE-
INGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 21, 2002, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/arti
cles/A62986-2002Mar21 .html.
[VOL. 78:2
2003] WAR ON TERRORISM OR GLOBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT? 343
evidence and call witnesses. 192 Classified evidence could be reviewed
by the defendant's counsel but not necessarily by the defendant
himself, 1
These rules may not satisfy ardent civil libertarians, but no one
can seriously question that they guarantee that life and liberty will not
be denied without due process of law. In addition, from the govern-
ment's perspective, they perform the important function of safeguard-
ing classified information and permitting the introduction of
evidence which may not fit the strict hearsay or chain of custody re-
quirements of the civilian courts. The obvious question is, if we are
truly in a war, why did we not use these commissions to try John
Walker Lindh and Zaccarias Moussaoui?
It is possible that the government's decision to prosecute Mous-
saoui in a U.S. district court can be traced to concern over the Su-
preme Court's post-Civil War opinion in Ex parte Milligan.194 Milligan
was the leader of a secret, anti-government society that supported the
Confederacy in the North. 19 5 The Supreme Court held that it was
unconstitutional to try Milligan for insurgency before a military com-
mission in Indiana because he was a resident of that state, because he
was not in the military service, and because the civilian courts were
available, open, and operating. 196 In addition, the state was not occu-
pied military territory or under martial law. 19 7 When German sabo-
teurs were caught in the United States during World War II, they also
maintained that they should be tried in civilian courts because they
were residing in this country, and the courts were open and operat-
ing. " 8 In Ex parte Quiin, however, the Supreme Court held that
whereas Milligan was a non-belligerent not subject to the laws of war
and military tribunals, the German saboteurs were enemy belligerents
and, thus, could legally be tried before a military commission. 199
Considering the circumstances of the Civil War, Quiin's rationale
may be a distinction without a difference. But regardless, Moussaoui's
activities, if the indictment is correct, go far beyond those of Milligan.
Specifically, the government has alleged that Moussaoui was involved
in the attempt to hijack planes and crash them into U.S. buildings
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
195 Id. at 6.
196 Id. at 121-25.
197 Id. at 126-27.
198 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1942).
199 Id. at 36-40.
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and/or to use crop dusters to spray poison over U.S. cities.2 00 That is,
he is charged with planning an attack against this country. This surely
constitutes belligerency within the ambit of Quirin and qualifies him,
like the German saboteurs, for trial before a military commission.
Senators Carl Levin and Joseph Lieberman both strongly criti-
cized the government's decision to try Moussaoui before a civilian
court .2 11 Sen. Lieberman stated, "What greater violation of the laws of
war could there be than to have been a co-conspirator in the attacks
that resulted in the deaths of four thousand Americans here on our
soil?"212 Sen. Levin and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
stated that the Justice Department did not consult with the Defense
Department prior to the indictment,2 13 suggesting that the decision
could have been the result of bureaucratic infighting. It is equally
possible that the administration was justifiably sensitive to potential
political reaction against military commissions. But whether the deci-
sion was the product of bureaucracy, politics, or overreaction to Milli-
gan, or a combination of all three, the trial of Moussaoui before a
civilian court instead of a military commission stands as a prime exam-
ple of the war on terrorism being conducted as a law enforcement
operation.
The same can be said of the decision to indict and try John
Walker Lindh before a civilian court. This decision was preordained
by the President's order limiting commissions to the trial of certain
non-citizens. 2114 The President likely imposed this restriction because
of the holding in Reid v. Covert20 5 that when the government reaches
out to punish a citizen abroad, "the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide . ..should not be stripped
away .. ,"206 But Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision in Verdugo-Ur-
quidez2°17 not only excluded aliens from the shelter of the Fourth
Amendment during the course of foreign searches but also chal-
lenged the belief that Reid demanded all-encompassing constitutional
protection for U.S. citizens wherever they might be.2013 The opinion
200 Indictment, United States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. filed
Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/
docs/64329/0.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
201 Rebecca Carr, Senators Question Terror 7ial in Federal Court, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Dec. 13, 2001, at IlA.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See Military Order, supra note 7, at 57,834.
205 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
206 Id. at 6.
207 494 U.S. 259 (1989).
208 Id. at 270-74.
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specifically noted that Reid was a plurality decision only and that Jus-
tices Harlan and Frankfurter had
resolved the case on much narrower grounds than the plurality and
declined even to hold that U.S. citizens were entitled to the full
range of constitutional protection.... [They believed] "the ques-
tion of which specific safeguards of the constitution are appropri-
ately to be applied in a particular context overseas can be reduced
to the issue of what process is 'due' a defendant in the particular
circumstances of a particular case."
20 9
Barona cited this passage in speculation about whether or not the Su-
preme Court would hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to U.S.
citizens overseas, 210 although Judge Sand in United States v. Bin Laden
assumed that would be the case. 21 1 But, at the very least, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist's opinion undermines any belief that Reid v. Covert auto-
matically guarantees civilian trials for terrorist acts committed outside
our territorial boundaries by U.S. citizens.
More directly on point is the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte
Quirin upholding the use of military commissions against the German
saboteurs caught in the United States. 212 In that case, most of the
German agents had lived in this country for years before the war,2 13
and at least one claimed U.S. citizenship at the time of his secret trial
in the Department of Justice before a military commission. 214 The
defense raised the issue of citizenship on appeal before the Supreme
Court, but the Court held that "[c]itizenship in the United States of
an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a
belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of
war."2 15 John Walker Lindh, and any other U.S. citizen affiliated with
al Qaeda, therefore, could be tried before a military commission. Ex-
cluding citizens from the President's order on military tribunals is,
again, symptomatic of an effort to treat the war on terrorism as a civil-
ian law enforcement operation.216
209 Id. at 270 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
210 United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1995).
211 United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
212 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46, 48 (1942).
213 Id. at 20.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 37.
216 In September 2002, the United States arrested five "U.S. born Yemenis" and
charged them in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York with
providing material support to terrorism in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2000). Josh
Tyrangiel, Breaking the Buffalo Five: Easy as "A,BC", TIME, Sept. 23, 2002, at 30. The
charges are based on the defendants' traveling to Afghanistan to train at al Qaeda
camps. Id. The defendants clearly need to be incarcerated, although proving the
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At publication of this Article, the government has not decided
how it will handle Jos6 Padilla, a U.S. citizen suspected of planning a
"dirty bomb" attack in the United States. As a U.S. citizen, Padilla
does not fit within the President's order on military commissions, and,
after his arrest in Chicago, he was held as a civilian prisoner. There
was, however, apparently insufficient admissible evidence to indict
him within the thirty days following arrest required by speedy trial
provisions217 for civilian criminal cases. Yet there is also good reason
to consider him a danger to the public safety if released. Accordingly,
the government recently announced that it is indefinitely detaining
Padilla as an "enemy combatant."218 This action, although proper in
the present author's opinion, at first blush appears inconsistent with
the order excluding U.S. citizens from such military procedures. If so,
the Padilla case further illustrates why the order should not be so
limited.
Although the use of military commissions can help avoid some of
the issues associated with collection of evidence and discovery of clas-
sified information, military commissions are not necessarily a panacea
that would cure all problems mentioned in this Article. Specifically, a
defendant tried before a military commission is likely to attempt to
suppress any statements that he made to the military or to the FBI on
the basis of alleged Fifth Amendment violations. If he is a citizen, he
will claim Fourth Amendment violations in connection with any
search and seizure. Useful evidence may have been destroyed during
armed conflict. It is even possible, as discussed later, that the defen-
dant may be able to assert lack ofjurisdiction. 21 9 Considering the fact
that these issues may be heard by the Supreme Court on writ of
habeas corpus, even trials by military commission can potentially be
ineffective as a means of defeating terrorism.
VI. CAN LAw ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION BE SUSTAINED?
The law enforcement approach to terrorism followed by our gov-
ernment before the second World Trade Center attack and continued
in part today necessarily raises the question of whether federal agents
specific charges may be challenging. This highlights the problem discussed in the
text and raises the interesting question: if five "U.S. born Germans" trained as sabo-
teurs and terrorists in German military camps had been arrested in the United States
during World War 11, would they have faced civilian criminal charges, or been treated
as the saboteurs in Ex parle Quirin and tried before a military commission?
217 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161.
218 Angie Cannon, Throwing Away the Key, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,June 24, 2002,
at 22, 22.
219 See infra Part Vi.
[VOL. 78:2
2003] WAR ON TERRORISM OR GLOBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT? 347
and the courts have legal jurisdiction to act in cases involving offenses
which may take place in various foreign locations. The President has
stated that we should eradicate all terrorists of global reach.220 As a
foreign policy and military proposition, that directive is beyond legal
challenge. The President may send the military to fight or provide
assistance wherever he believes such action is consistent with U.S. for-
eign policy interests as long as Congress permits, or at least acquiesces
in, the deployment. 221 He may do so even if there is a strong argu-
ment, as was the case with Lebanon, Somalia, and Vietnam, 222 that
events in the nation selected for U.S. military intervention will have no
direct impact on this country. Criminal law, however, requires that
the government and the courts have legal jurisdiction to act.223 Are
members of al Qaeda or other terrorist groups related to a larger or-
ganization captured in the Philippines, or even in Afghanistan, while
fighting to overthrow or support a specific local government such as
the Taliban subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction? Was it permissible to
charge John Walker Lindh, as was done in Counts Two and Three of
his indictment, with assisting the Harakat ul Mujahideen, a group con-
ducting terrorist activity in Kashmir against India?224 Was the govern-
ment legally justified in charging Ramsey Yousef with placing a bomb
on a Philippine airliner en route from the Philippines to Tokyo that
killed a Japanese citizen?225
As a general rule, U.S. criminal law encompasses acts that occur
on U.S. soil. In certain instances, however, Congress has made it clear
that specific criminal statutes should have extraterritorial effect. For
example, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) states,
"This section is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or
220 See Apple, supra note 1.
221 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (articulating the extent to which the President may set policy without
violating the separation of powers); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 318-22 (1936) (explaining that the President has broad powers to set for-
eign policy). For further information, see RonaldJ. Sievert, Campbell v. Clinton and
the Continuing Effort To Reassert Congress' Predominant Constitutional Authority To Com-
mence, or Prevent, War, 105 DICK. L. REv. 157, 157-59 (2001) (discussing the conflict
between Congress and the President over the exercise of war power).
222 See CANNON, supra note 2, at 654 (Lebanon); COLIN POWELL, MY AMERICAN
JOURNEY 564-67 (1995) (Somalia); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDYAND
His TIMES 841-50 (1978) (Vietnam).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 678-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
224 Indictment, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37-A (E.D. Va. filed Feb. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/2ndindictment.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
225 See Yousef 927 F. Supp. at 675.
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distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."226 Section 32 of 18 U.S. Code prohibits attacks against
"civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or
foreign air commerce."227 Our anti-terrorism statutes criminalize acts,
such as conspiring to assault American citizens abroad"2 s and conspir-
ing to cross U.S. borders to destroy buildings, 229 and contain provi-
sions stating that "there is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction... over
any offense" violating these statutes.
231
The courts have consistently held, however, that a mere state-
ment of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the legislature does not end the
inquiry as to proper jurisdiction over matters that occur outside of our
borders. As the court stated in United States v. Davis, "We require
[that] Congress make clear its intent to give extraterritorial effect to
its statutes. And secondly, as a matter of constitutional law, we require
that application of the statute to the acts in question not violate the
due process clause of the fifth amendment."21 In other words, "there
must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United
States . . . so that such application would not be arbitrary or funda-
mentally unfair. '23 2 "Nexus," as noted by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, "ensures that a United States 'court will as-
sert jurisdiction only over a defendant who 'should reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court' in this country. "233
International law has been held to be a proper guide as to
whether sufficient nexus exists to comply with constitutional due pro-
cess. 234 For example, if the act was intended to take effect in the
United States, or either a U.S. national or U.S. facility was the target,
the territorial, passive personality, and protective principles of interna-
tional law would provide a basis for U.S. jurisdiction. 23 5 The more
226 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(h) (2000).
227 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1).
228 Id. § 2332. See also United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
for extraterritorial application of U.S. export control laws.
229 18 U.S.C. § 2332a.
230 Id. § 2332b(e).
231 United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
232 Id. at 248-49 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But see United States v.
Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 372-77 (5th Cir. 2002) (surveying Supreme Court opinions and
holding that "due process does not require a nexus for the MDLEA's extraterritorial
application").
233 United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (quot-
ing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980)).
234 Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2.
235 See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States
v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984).
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difficult question, however, involves the terrorist act that does not di-
rectly impact the United States, such as those in Indonesia, Afghani-
stan, or Israel, targeting local or adjacent governments.
Can the United States properly invoke criminal lawjurisdiction in
such cases? According to the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, the courts may have jurisdiction for "certain offenses
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such
as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war
crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism ' 236 even absent any spe-
cific connection between the state and the offense. Citing this provi-
sion as a foundation for Israeli jurisdiction against a World War II
concentration camp guard in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,237 the Sixth Cir-
cuit stated:
When proceeding on that jurisdictional premise, neither the na-
tionality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the
crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes
are offenses against the law of nations or against humanity and that
the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations.
23 8
In United States v. Yunis,2 39 a decision involving a 1985 aircraft
hijacking in Beirut, and in United States v. Yousef 2 4 0 the aircraft bomb-
ing referenced above, the courts favorably cited the universality princi-
ple as a potential basis for the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction.241
However, as the hijacking in Yunis affected two American citizens and
the bombing in Yousef was part of a larger plot eventually to attack
U.S. airliners, neither case stands for the proposition that the United
States can proceed against terrorists on the basis of universal jurisdic-
tion alone. But in United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo,242 a narcotics case
under the MDLEA, the Third Circuit held that the United States
could exercise jurisdiction over a vessel found in international waters
carrying 282 kilos of cocaine solely because "the trafficking of narcot-
ics is condemned universally by law-abiding nations . . . [It is not]
'fundamentally unfair' for Congress to provide for the punishment of
persons apprehended with narcotics on the high seas. '243 The Court
further stated that "in concluding that there is no due process prob-
236 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987).
237 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
238 Id. at 582-83.
239 Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086.
240 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
241 Yunis, 942 F.2d at 1091; Yousef, 927 F. Supp. at 681-82.
242 993 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1993).
243 Id. at 1056.
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lem here, we pose the rhetorical question of who would prosecute
narcotics offenders in cases such as this if the United States did
not?"
2 4 4
It is, nevertheless, far from certain that U.S. civilian courts will
look favorably upon exercising jurisdiction based on universality
against suspects caught in the President's effort to eradicate global
terrorism. One commentator has questioned whether terrorism can
be labeled a crime against humanity in the same category as such of-
fenses as the trading of slaves and piracy because terrorism is often
state-sponsored or politically motivated.245 Furthermore, although
states and the international community have relied upon universality
to try World War II war criminals such as the Nuremberg defendants
and Adolph Eichmann, apparently the United States is the only gov-
ernment that has ever asserted universality as a potential basis for try-
ing terrorists who may not directly impact the nation.246 The
philosophy behind Martinez's rhetorical question, asking in effect who
will prosecute international drug dealers (or terrorists), may also raise
a note of caution with some courts. They may believe that if we pur-
sue those who commit terrorist acts in the Philippines, Kashmir, or
elsewhere, we will be acting as the oft-criticized "world's policeman"
when it would be better for others to accept responsibility for matters
taking place in their own backyard. Moreover, the actual holding of
Martinez accepting universal jurisdiction has not been adopted by
other circuits. 2
47
Accordingly, it cannot be assumed that U.S. courts will com-
pletely embrace the concept of universality. They may demand at
least some U.S. nexus similar to that present in Yunis and Yousef
before accepting jurisdiction in a terrorist case. 248 This requirement
would indicate that U.S. policymakers, before attempting to proceed,
may want to evaluate closely all potential terrorists cases involving ac-
tion in foreign lands, including Afghanistan, and to insure that the
244 Id. at 1057.
245 Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks,
35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 348 (2001).
246 See Yousef, 927 F. Supp. at 681; Indictment, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37-A
(E.D. Va. filed Feb. 5, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/2ndindictment.
htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). See also Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of
UniversalJurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383 passim (2001) for a discussion of catego-
ries of crime subject to universal jurisdiction.
247 See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Greer, 956 F. Supp. 531, 536 (D. Vt. 1997.)
248 See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
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defendant's connection with the United States is open and obvious
before attempting to proceed.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
To paraphrase Stewart Baker, quoted earlier in this Article, 249 we
have 'judicialized" more aspects of human behavior than any civiliza-
tion in history, and we may have come to the limit of that. Our past
and continuing focus on civilian criminal trials, with their attendant
interrogation, search, and discovery issues, becomes problematic
when our primary goal should be to fight a war successfully. The mili-
tary role need not be exclusive, but it must be made clear that it is
predominant. This will facilitate intelligent decisions when the inevi-
table conflicts arise between the philosophy and culture of the mili-
tary and law enforcement, and it will prevent mixed messages that can
potentially undermine the overall anti-terrorist effort.
If the military approach prevails, we will understand that religious
fundamentalists who attack military targets in the Middle East or else-
where and defend their homeland are, in essence, soldiers. They may
be attacked, killed, or captured, and if captured should be treated as
POWs. Trials, with Fourth and Fifth Amendment, as well as other,
legal issues, need not be considered for these individuals. Because
POWs may be retained "for the duration," there will naturally be de-
bate as to how long they should actually be held. But there need not
be dispute as to how they are initially handled by the government.
Those who attack civilians are in a different category because they
have violated the laws of war. They are war criminals. If captured,
they should not be incarcerated for the duration, but may be sen-
tenced to life or even assessed the death penalty. Such sentencing
requires trials. In accordance with a predominant military role, how-
ever, these trials, in the present author's opinion, should be con-
ducted by military commissions. Such tribunals will avoid the
problems inherent in evidence collection, discovery of intelligence in-
formation, and physical security.
Defendants tried before military commissions will still raise
Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues, and these issues may eventually
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. If the government intends to
challenge a defendant's invocation of U.S. constitutional rights, the
government might be in a better posture if interrogations and
searches were conducted by the military and CIA. The practice of
having FBI agents accompany Special Forces as reported in this Arti-
249 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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cle can in a reviewing court's opinion potentially convert an interroga-
tion or search for intelligence into a full-scale law enforcement
inquiry. The law enforcement approach is likely to carry with it a
mandate that the agents comply with traditional Fourth and Fifth
Amendment requirements.
But even if the FBI is involved in the initial stages, the govern-
ment should consider testing any defendant's claim that Miranda ap-
plies overseas or that any foreign searches must be supported by
probable cause or foreign law. The government should do so because
decisions such as Barona2 50 and Bin Laden,25' although well-reasoned,
are cutting-edge and may not comport with the thinking of the Rehn-
quist Court as to the extraterritorial application of constitutional
rights.
Finally, Congress may want to consider the creation of a Foreign
Search Court on the model of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. The difficulties of fighting a war on terrorism, especially when
relying upon criminal procedures, are compounded when the ter-
rorists have obtained American citizenship. Classic examples are John
Walker Lindh and Wadi el Hage, the bin Laden supporter whose
apartment was searched in Kenya, leading to Judge Sand's opinion in
Bin Laden.252 As noted above, such defendants will raise Fourth
Amendment challenges to overseas searches regardless of the forum.
Barona's reliance on foreign law to justify these intrusions may not
stand. It may also be practically impossible to comply with a host
country's legal requirements. The United States could, as an alterna-
tive, seek a later ruling from the trial judge that the agents acted rea-
sonably in conducting the search, as was suggested by the dissent in
Barona.25 13 But this approach would put the government in the posi-
tion of not knowing whether it was likely that it would be able to intro-
duce seized evidence until trial. If agents were allowed to seek
permission early in the process from a specially designated court, how-
ever, an impartial judge would be able to evaluate the reasons for the
search beforehand, and the government, thereafter acting in good
faith reliance, would be relatively certain of admissibility of the evi-
dence. It is true, as noted in Verdugo-Urquidez, that a U.S. court has no
authority overseas, 25 4 but the constitutionality of a search, like the vol-
untariness of a confession, is finally evaluated when the evidence is
250 United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
251 United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
252 Id.
253 Barona, 56 F.3d at 1102 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
254 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990).
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offered in a U.S. court. A prior ruling by a special magistrate could,
therefore, be acknowledged by the trial court at the time the evidence
is presented in much the same way that trial courts generally accept
the findings of magistrates who issue domestic search warrants.
The creation of such a Foreign Search Court, however, should
not obscure the fact that our primary focus in the immediate future
should be on the military. Our war against terrorism is critical to the
well-being of our nation and the survival of our people. Despite our
initial victories, it is clear that this will be a long struggle. It is now
time, in the early stages of this conflict, to reconsider the philosophy
that dominated the last decade and to recognize that we are not chas-
ing domestic criminals but are fighting a war.
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